National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday 30 March 1983

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
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LEBANON: Increasing Problems With the Shias		
Clashes last weekend between armed Shia demonstratebanese security personnel in West Beirut reflect growing antigovernment sentiment among Lebanon's largest and preligious sect.	ng	25 X 1
rengious seet.		23/1
The clashes, in which 17 were injured, marked the first government forces have faced concerted armed resistant Army entered West Beirut last September. The demonstructure protesting the arrest of 28 members of Amal, the mainling organization, in connection with the government's investive recent attacks on members of the multinational peacekee	ce since the ators were e Shia gation of	
Beirut.	pg	25X1]
		25X1
The US Embassy reports that in predominantly Shia s	n the	
Israelis—resentment over the occupation is increasing. T government fears that its inability to exercise control in the	ne central ne area will	
turn more Shias against it.		25X1
Comment: Although Amal is progovernment, the autibelieve it is heavily penetrated by Iranian supporters. In traleftist Shias and fundamentalists sympathetic to Iran, the risks provoking a general Shia backlash.	acking down	25 X 1
The revenue and love has been bounded.		
The government long has been indifferent to the Shia the most politically and economically deprived confession Lebanon. Their growing political activism, however, make potential source of instability that Beirut cannot afford to ignore.	nal group in es them a	25 X 1

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
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PANAMA: Shifting Foreign Policy		
The confused foreign policy positions taken I		
government officials reflect the rivalry between Pa de la Espriella and National Guard Commander F		25 X 1
de la Espirena and Ivanonal duale commandel l	arodos.	25/
		25 X 1
The LIC Fush convey year out a confliction of constant	an Abrahamana an Ala	
The US Embassy reports conflicting signals i statements about the retention of the US Army S		
Americas in Panama beyond 1984. The announc		
last week that the school will revert to Panama n		
subsequently was modified by the Foreign Minist Chief of Staff Noriega. They have suggested inde		
school might be retained in exchange for an incr		
sugar exports to the US.		25 X 1
Comment: De la Espriella probably sees his	authority as	
increasingly undermined by the growing political		
Paredes. More confusion in foreign policy is likely		
using anti-US rhetoric—bids for the support of le President believes his usefulness to the government		
however, he may decide to resign before election		
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USSR: Hints of Political Disarray

The US Embassy reports rumors of a recent hospitalization or attempted assassination of General Secretary Andropov have become more widespread. In addition, the Embassy notes that some of its informants now believe that the Central Committee plenum that had been predicted for this week will be held next month, while others believe it will occur in June. Meanwhile, a Soviet science official has told the Embassy that a Karl Marx commemorative meeting would be held today and that the speaker would be party secretary Chernenko.

Comment: Despite the seeming disarray, Andropov recently has made a strong showing. In the past week, for example, he has talked with two foreign visitors, responded to President Reagan's speech, and seen his ally, Foreign Minister Gromyko, promoted to First Deputy Premier. If a plenum was postponed, it may have been because Andropov was not yet ready to make key personnel changes. The choice of a speaker for a Karl Marx commemorative meeting has been the subject of conflicting reports, suggesting some disagreement in the leadership.


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
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	NICARAGUA: Continued Pressure on the Church	
	Church officials are preparing a formal protest of the	
	government's prohibition of live broadcasts of Holy Week religious	
	services on Managua's Catholic radio station. The government's action is the first application of a directive requiring prior censorship	
	of all programing by the few remaining independent radio stations. Earlier this month the Sandinistas issued a point-by-point rebuttal of	
	the Pope's endorsement of the right of the Church to control the curriculum in Catholic schools.	25 X 1
	Comment: The Sandinistas appear confident they can continue	
	their campaign against the Church hierarchy, despite potentially adverse domestic and international reaction. Last year the	
	government failed to discourage participation in Holy Week	
	processions. In the current tense atmosphere, supporters of Archbishop Obando y Bravo may clash with those backing the	
•	government and the "popular church."	25 X 1
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NORTH YEMEN: Use of Tribal Militia
North Yemen is forming a tribal militia in the recently liberated
Jabal Murays area near the border with South Yemen
The militia will be used to help prevent a
resurgence of activity by insurgents of the Aden-supported National
Democratic Front. A similar unit, composed of former Front fighters,
has been operating effectively near Damt. North Yemeni regular
forces are strengthening bases along the border and could easily
reenter the Jabal Murays area if needed.
Comment: The government's increasing use of tribal militias
represents a new emphasis on irregular forces in its counter-
insurgency strategy. In the past regular forces swept Front-controlled
areas, but often did not remain long enough to prevent the insurgents
from returning. To solidify his government's gains, President Salih has
promised economic aid for areas formerly controlled by the Front, but
this may be prevented by Sanaa's increasing financial problems.

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
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